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THE PEOPLE’S AGENT: EXECUTIVE
BRANCH SECRECY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO* AND RENA I. STEINZOR**
I
INTRODUCTION
The increase in government secrecy is an important and troubling policy
trend. Although the trend predates it, the movement toward government
secrecy has accelerated dramatically since the 2000 presidential election. The
Bush Administration has initiated significant legislative and administrative
changes that have expanded the government’s authority to operate behind
closed doors.1 Vigorously defending its preoccupation with secrecy as the
necessary prerogative of a strong and effective executive branch, the
Administration invokes the “war on terrorism” to justify withholding
information that was routinely disclosed by past Presidents.
Claims that the executive branch needs extensive secrecy to operate
effectively are troublesome because of the important role transparency plays in
the American constitutional system of checks and balances. When secrecy
becomes sufficiently pervasive, it becomes difficult, even impossible, for
Congress and the public to determine what is going on in the executive branch.
Government failures are hidden and the public interest suffers. Indeed, it is not
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an exaggeration to say that pervasive secrecy can fatally undermine the
structure of our constitutional government by allowing the executive branch to
withhold crucial information from the other two branches and, as important, a
free press.
Nevertheless, absolute transparency is neither a realistic nor an appropriate
goal. The release of some types of information can do more harm than good.
Detailed information about the precise location of chemical stockpiles that
could be used by terrorists to wreak havoc is one example, but there are other
areas in which the public interest may favor nondisclosure, such as protecting
legitimate trade secrets that have never been circulated publicly or preserving
the confidentiality of information that would compromise individual privacy
rights. The nation’s premier open government law, the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA),2 recognizes a number of situations in which Congress has
determined that the public interest is best served by nondisclosure.3
The difficult public policy issue, of course, is striking an appropriate balance
between openness and secrecy, and there is a considerable literature debating
the merits of particular tradeoffs.4 In Washington, however, this careful and
thoughtful debate increasingly seems beside the point as the executive branch
ignores both the spirit and the letter of FOIA and similar laws. It is more and
more difficult to pry timely responses from agencies and departments to legally
sound FOIA requests, and more and more information is withheld entirely,
often on specious grounds.5
Despite concerns expressed across the political spectrum by commentators
and advocates,6 the public seems generally apathetic regarding these
developments. One reason for this apathy appears to be the Administration’s
use of the war on terrorism as the “poster child” for its efforts to avoid
accountability in policy areas that have little or nothing to do with national
security. This characterization places public interest advocates in the position
of making the case for open government on a more demanding field of battle

2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
3. See id. at § 552(b).
4. See, e.g., Keith Anderson, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of Information
Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605 (2003); Dianna G. Goldenson, FOIA Exemption Five:
Will It Protect Government Scientists from Unfair Intrusion?, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311 (2002);
Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict Between
Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71
(2003).
5. See Editorial, The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at A20, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/12/opinion/12tue3.html?8br.
6. Conservatives are equally concerned about these issues as progressives because they fear that
concentrated government power not held accountable to the citizenry will evolve into a totalitarian
state. See, e.g., Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25 (Director,
Heritage Foundation’s Center for Media and Public Policy), cited in SECRECY IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 9.
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where officials argue that anyone requesting information must demonstrate
affirmatively that disclosure will be absolutely useless to terrorists.7
The case for open government is based on political principles embraced by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Transparency plays an important role in
our constitutional system of checks and balances, not least because it is the
condition precedent for a free press. Although thoughtful people from the
framers to modern-day political scientists acknowledge that at times the
government must act in secret, an underlying assumption of American
democracy is that the people have a right to know about business transacted in
their name.
This article seeks to bolster these arguments by applying “agency theory,” a
school of thought that was developed by the law and economics literature, to
the question of how much secrecy is too much. Although agency theory is most
often used to analyze private sector economic relationships, commentators have
also applied it to the analysis of methods for holding legislators and executive
branch officials accountable to the public. This paper extends this literature by
using agency theory to evaluate the impact of burgeoning secrecy on the
likelihood that executive branch officials will engage in faithful and forceful
implementation of statutory mandates, particularly in the arenas of protecting
public health, safety, and natural resources.
The paper begins by explaining why agency theory is useful in analyzing
how the government should resolve conflicts between transparency and other
important public policy objectives. This analysis yields the following insight:
whereas wise policymaking requires a balancing of competing interests in
secrecy and openness, such decisions must be made by dispassionate and
authoritative officials who have no personal stake in whether the information is
ultimately disclosed.
The paper then turns to an examination of the three primary statutes
governing information disclosure and transparency: FOIA, the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA),8 and the Critical Infrastructure Information
Act (CIIA),9 which was passed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.10
All three statutes are involved in the trend toward greater secrecy. Judicial

7. Lest the reader think this is an exaggeration, consider an article written by Professor Steinzor’s
clinical law students about the unpleasant experiences they had representing a community group
concerned about toxic pollution at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground in Aberdeen, Maryland.
Christopher Gozdor et al., Where the Streets Have No Name: The Collision of Environmental Law and
Information Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10978 (2003). To make a long story
short, the article reports the Army withheld the street names from maps depicting environmental
contamination, although maps with the street names shown could be purchased at any local gas station,
on the grounds that the Army’s maps might make it marginally easier for terrorists to attack the base
because it would constitute an additional dissemination of the information in the specific context of
hazardous waste. See id. at 10982-83, 10994.
8. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15 (2000).
9. 6 U.S.C. §§ 131–134 (Supp. II 2002).
10. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C §§ 101557 (Supp. II 2002)) [hereinafter Homeland Security Act].
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interpretations and executive branch hostility have narrowed the application of
FOIA and FACA. The CIIA, passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, unreasonably ignores the tradeoffs between greater
government secrecy and transparency in favor of maximizing government
secrecy. The cumulative impact of these changes is to make it more difficult to
hold executive branch officials accountable when their self-interest lies in
keeping information confidential in order to prevent political embarrassment.
The principle of maintaining a balance between public accountability and
national security is eroded, as is the foundation of the U.S. constitutional
democracy.
Congress should amend FOIA and FACA to reverse judicial interpretations
that have weakened these laws by restoring the open government requirements
that Congress intended to impose in enacting them. And Congress should limit
the secrecy protections of the CIIA to situations in which there is a reasonable
likelihood that transparency presents a tangible risk to the nation’s security. In
isolation, these changes will not be enough to forestall executive branch abuses.
But they will begin to reverse the harmful trends we have identified by making
it easier for the public and the free press to expose illegitimate secrets.
II
AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Agency theory is commonly used to analyze contractual arrangements
designed to address the risk that an agent, such as a corporate manager, will
serve his or her own interests, rather than the interests of the principal.
Applying agency theory to the relationship between the public and the
executive branch can explain why it is considerably more difficult to control
agents in political contexts than in corporate contexts and emphasizes the
importance of maximizing government transparency.
A. The Principal–Agent Relationship
An organization is formed in response to collective-action problems that
constrain individuals from undertaking common action that is to their mutual
benefit.11 Persons who form the organization, the “principals,” inevitably
depend on “agents” to achieve the gains from collective action, and the
expected mutual gains can be lost if an agent’s self-interest diverges from a
principal’s goals.12 The difference between results achievable by an agent acting
solely in the interest of the principal and actual results is described by

11. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 15 (1971).
12. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 24–25 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991).
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economists and other social scientists as an “agency cost.”13 Principals can
combat this downside and avoid agency costs if they have the tools and
resources needed to prevent their agents from getting sidetracked in the pursuit
of the principal’s interests.
The core concepts of agency-cost problems in the corporate context14 can be
extrapolated to the government arena by substituting “the people”—defined as
all of the nation’s citizens—for a corporation’s shareholders. In a constitutional
democracy like ours, the people incur analogous agency costs concerning the
performance of the executive branch.

People

Article II

Article I

Congress

Statutory Mandate

Executive
Branch

The people “employ” the executive branch as their agent in the two ways
depicted by this diagram.15 In some circumstances, the executive branch acts

13. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (offering theory of agency costs
in principal–agent relationships).
The concept of “agency costs” includes both the cost to the principal associated with the agent
failing to pursue the principal’s interests and the cost incurred by the principal to prevent the agent
from deviating from the principal’s interests. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS 462 (1998). The term “divergence costs” can be used to describe the portion of agency costs
attributable to the cost of the agent to act to further the principal’s interest. See, e.g., Richard L.
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1140
(1990).
14. A substantial body of literature discusses the nature of agency cost problems in the corporate
context. See, e.g., John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zerckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 3 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zerckhauser eds., 1991) (describing the literature).
15. To analyze agency in the political context, Professors Kiewiet and McCubbins use a more
general definition of “principal” and “agent” than is used in the economics literature. They note that
the economic definition of a principal is someone who signs a binding contract with someone else—the
agent—for performance of specified services. In the political context, they propose an agency
relationship is established “when an agent is delegated, implicitly or explicitly, the authority to take
action on behalf of another, that is, the principal.” KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 12, at 239–40
ch.2 n.1. The same definition is adopted here.
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directly on behalf of citizens, invoking the President’s authority under Article II
of the Constitution.16 Article II constitutes the agency contract between the
people and the President. In other instances, citizens “employ” Congress as
their agent to enact legislation. The Congress in such instances is acting under
the powers granted to it by Article I of the Constitution.17 Article I constitutes
an agency contract between the people and Congress. Congress, in turn,
performs a subdelegation, transferring power to the executive branch to
implement the legislation. The agency contract involved in this subdelegation is
the statute enacted by Congress.
The congressional role can be analogized to the function served by the
board of directors of a corporation. The board serves as the agent of the
stockholders. But the board hires managers to implement its policies. In the
same manner, Congress turns to the executive branch to implement certain
congressional policies. Although the managers are chosen by the board, they
are still “agents” of the stockholders.18 And although, through statutes,
Congress directs the executive branch, the executive branch is still the agent of
the people.
Speaking of the American people as a principal, or even a group of
principals, is admittedly a simplification because people have diverse interests,
even with respect to collective action. Nevertheless, when legislation is enacted,
it can be regarded as an expression of the people regarding the nature and
scope of the collective action they seek. This characterization is useful even
though the enacted legislation may imperfectly reflect the will of the citizenry
(itself an agency-cost problem). The legislature in our constitutional system is
“understood to serve—even if imperfectly and not without significant moments
of contestation—as the privileged institutional expression of the capacity of the
‘people’ or the ‘nation’ to rule itself.”19 Characterizing the executive branch as
an agent of the people is another simplification because it does not take into
account the reality that the executive branch is comprised of numerous and
varied centers of political power that engage in a constant struggle for control
with each other. Nevertheless, viewing the executive branch as the people’s
agent in carrying out the mandates conferred by the people’s surrogate, that is,

16. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
17. See id. art. I.
18. When the board of directors hires company executives, it will contract with them to fulfill the
interests of the principals, assuming board members themselves act as faithful agents of the
stockholders when they perform this function. The company executives are therefore also agents of the
stockholders, although they are hired by the board.
19. Peter Lindseth, Agents Without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and Fragmented
Governance 2 (Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 18, 2004), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/18.
It also does not matter for this purpose that enacted legislation may imperfectly reflect the
preference of legislators. Although Congress may be a disparate collection of 535 individual legislators,
the agency approach envisions Congress in the ultimate role it was assigned by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution: acting to pass legislation, reconciling differences between the House and Senate, and
referring final conference report to the President for his signature. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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the Congress, correctly reflects the legal roles assigned by the Constitution20 and
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),21 which views the executive
branch as an institution that takes “final agency action” pursuant to statutes
that are then subject to review by the courts.22
B. Agency Costs
The implementation of legislation by the executive branch almost always
creates the potential for agency costs.23 Professor Peter Lindseth, who has also
written of the relationship between these branches in terms of agency theory,
explains, “[t]he reality of the situation will of course be that the agent enjoys
some measure of autonomy—often a significant amount, in fact [as a result of]
vague delegations as well as the inherent limitations of the principal’s capacity
for supervision and control.”24 The task of a principal, Lindseth continues, “is to
ensure that the agent will not pursue its own interests rather than those of the
legislature—what economists call the ‘agency cost problem.’”25
Much of the time, executive branch officials faithfully implement regulatory
legislation.26 At times, however, several factors converge to lead them off this
path.27 Administrators may fail to serve the public’s interests, as defined by
statutory mandates, because their efforts are not very effective or because they
prefer not to work very hard. In addition, administrators, including the
President, are vulnerable to the demands of special interests that conflict with
effective implementation and enforcement of such mandates. Officials, in
particular political appointees, may be tempted to yield to special-interest
pleading, especially when satisfying those interests serves the officials’ own
goals. For example, the President must seek reelection supported by
considerable fundraising. Other officials are tempted to gain security, develop
future job prospects, or follow their own policy preferences. Whatever the
cause, those who would benefit from the regulations will end up shouldering the
costs of failing to discover when agents do not represent them faithfully. Those

20. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000).
22. See, e.g., id. §§ 551–553
23. The political science literature characterizes agency costs as “bureaucratic drift” to indicate
administrators have failed to achieve the goals of the coalition that enacted a statutory mandate. See,
e.g., Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536, 537
(2002) (discussing bureaucratic drift).
24. Lindseth, supra note 19, at 3.
25. Id.
26. See STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 250–54, 266 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1987) (“[T]he more important a policy is, the less
important is the role of self-interest in determining that policy.”); Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 66 (1998) (“[R]egulatory
outcomes ameliorate market failures and vindicate the citizenry’s interests . . . more commonly than
other scholars of regulation acknowledge . . . .”).
27. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106, 12425 (1991) (special issue).
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costs can include fraud and other forms of economic waste28 and can even be
life-threatening.29
The potential for agency costs is greater when Congress, beset by intense
controversy and the clashing of politically and economically powerful forces,
enacts ambiguous legislation that does not resolve significant issues but instead
redirects them to the administrative process, thereby delegating substantial
discretion to administrators. The likelihood of drift is greater in policy arenas
where the results of an agent’s actions are less obvious and government
activities are harder to scrutinize.
The arena of health and safety regulation is a prime breeding ground for
agency-cost problems because such regulation typically involves ambiguous
delegation and a lack of transparency. Environmental policymaking, in
particular, is highly contested terrain involving frequent clashes between
powerful business interests and highly motivated environmental organizations.30
The results of an agent’s actions are difficult to discern because environmental
exposures to harmful pollutants are both pervasive and poorly understood.31
Very often, the adverse effects of such exposures are diseases (for example,
cancer), that have long latency periods, obscuring the connection between
industrial practices, regulation, exposure, and health consequences. Or such
adverse effects are very subtle and difficult to detect, such as the loss of a few
IQ points. Executive branch officials coping with such issues are quickly
submerged in highly technical debates, losing their footing in response to an
onslaught of advocacy by regulated industries and public interest advocates.
The success of efforts to track such complex debates and to explain to the
public why and how its agents have faltered depends on the active involvement
of a free press. Reporters have a difficult time sorting through the morass of
technical claims and counterclaims even when their organizations give them the

28. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Pentagon ‘Hid’ Damning Halliburton Audit, GUARDIAN, Mar.
16, 2005, at 13 (describing the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s report finding the Pentagon knew that
Halliburton has overcharged the United States at least $108.4 million).
29. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Official Admits ‘Lapses’ On Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005,
at A15 (describing how the Food and Drug Administration was aware that the drug Vioxx could cause
heart attacks or strokes for over a year before it made that information available to prescribing
physicians); Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, Mercury Emissions Rule Geared to Benefit Industry,
Staffers Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at A1 (explaining how the White House and political
appointees at the Environmental Protection Agency rewrote regulations for coal-fired power plants to
reduce their effectiveness in reducing mercury contamination of the human food chain).
30. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (explaining the
clash of interests in the passage of the nation’s environmental laws).
31. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 491 (2003) (“[C]ertain conventional air pollutants have become nearly ubiquitous.”); Carol
Browner & Dan Glickman, Clean Water Acton Plan: Restoring and Protecting America’s Waters 7–9
(Feb. 14, 1998), http://water.usgs.gov/owq/cleanwater/action/cwap.pdf (detailing the “serious water
quality problems [that] persist throughout the country”); Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics,
EPA, Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study 2 (1998), http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/
hazchem.pdf (explaining that EPA’s ability to protect public health is impaired by lack of
understanding about certain High Production Volume Chemicals to which the public is exposed in
amounts greater than one million pounds every year).
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luxury of sticking with a story for more than one news cycle. In the wake of the
tragedies that began on September 11, 2001, those conditions and opportunities
have become scarce while other crises, at home and abroad, compete for the
media’s attention.
C. Tools to Reduce Agency Costs
An agency-cost problem can arise in any principal-agent relationship. Every
principal therefore has an incentive to use tools to reduce agency costs up to the
point at which the expense of using these tools exceeds the agency costs that the
tools prevent. A principal can reduce agency costs by negotiating highly
specific contracts that explain expectations and set standards for performance
and then by monitoring the agent’s actual performance under the contract. In
addition, the principal can use financial incentives to align the self-interest of
the agent with that of the principal. The use of these tools can be difficult with
either private or public agents, but it is generally easier to reduce agency costs
in the private sector than the public sector.
1. Contracting
A principal can seek to control an agent through comprehensive
contracting. In economic contexts, there is an actual contract. In the public
sector, as suggested earlier, a statute functions as a kind of employment
contract. The contract specifies the duties of the agent, implicitly stipulating
that the agent’s success will be measured against these goals. In both the
private and public contexts, however, the principal is subject to “bounded
rationality”—significant time, resource, and cognitive restraints that limit its
capacity to anticipate and specify how the agent should act when new
contingencies arise.32 Because most principals are usually subject to at least
some level of bounded rationality, comprehensive and definitive contracting is
normally impossible except in simple transactions.33
As difficult as principals in the private sector find it to reduce their agency
costs through contracting, the public sector encounters significantly more
daunting problems for two reasons. First, the problems that Congress tackles
are typically much more complex and affect a far larger and diverse set of
stakeholders than the typical corporate transaction.
[T]he basic separation between polity and economy has always, even amongst the
most confirmed libertarians, left a residual of activities to be undertaken by
government because of the inherent difficulty that arose from the public good
attributes, free riding and costly information of certain types of activity . . . . Those
that can be readily handled by individual or small group bargaining don’t need to be
34
placed on the public agenda . . . .

32. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45 (1987).
33. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
34. Douglas C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 361–62
(1990).
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Further, the dimensions of what constitutes success are infinitely more intricate,
incorporating a broad range of intangible values and straying far from the profit
motive that is at the heart of the corporate mission. In health and safety
regulation, these difficulties are compounded by the need to take action to
prevent harm without the luxury of definitive scientific evidence regarding how,
when, and why the harm will occur.35
Second, the private sector generally finds it less costly to switch agents.36
Principals may find it difficult to remove corporate officers who fail to serve the
principals’ interests, but the private sector principal has the option of selling
stock in one corporation and replacing it with stock in another corporation that
has more reliable agents. By comparison, the public cannot readily or
inexpensively replace executive branch agents because there are both timing
and severability problems. The President runs for election only every four
years and voters have no direct way of either voting for or removing members
of the Cabinet or other administrators. Unless there is sufficient public outcry,
the President is reluctant to fire administrators revealed to have engaged in
malfeasance or nonfeasance because such behavior reflects poorly on the
administration.
2. Financial Incentives
In addition to having a significantly easier time negotiating highly specific
contracts that define expectations and set standards for success, private sector
principals can rely to a greater extent on financial incentives to reduce agency
costs.37 Although the economic performance of a firm is not a perfect indicator
of an agent’s loyalty or ability given economic factors beyond managerial
control, profitability offers private-sector principals a reasonable way to
measure the performance of their agents. As the most obvious example, the
compensation of a manager can be based on the economic performance of the
firm. In all but the most dysfunctional firms, regular performance evaluations
make it clear, from the top of the organization to the bottom and up again, what
accomplishments will be rewarded and what outcomes viewed with disfavor.
Even these concrete and time-tested incentives are imperfect. Turnover in
executive suites may be routine, but many companies retain their leadership
long after they have suffered severe financial reversals.
Congress faces greater, even insurmountable, hurdles in using financial
rewards to motivate its bureaucratic agents for several reasons. Not only are
the goals set for bureaucrats significantly more complex and amorphous, but it
is much more difficult to measure public sector agency costs because of the

35. See Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An Essay on Legal
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 583-87 (1983).
36. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (describing exit as a strategy
to agency-cost problems).
37. See id. at 10–11.
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difficulty of specifying and measuring what constitutes good performance.38 If
we are uncertain about the nature and extent of the risks posed by toxic
pollution, for example, how can we measure the after-the-fact success of
measures designed to avoid such risks?
The closest Congress has come to mimicking private sector financial
incentives is the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA),39 one
of several “good government” laws designed to improve public sector
managerial performance.40 The GPRA requires agencies and departments to
develop performance plans and then report on their progress in achieving the
goals they have identified. Embraced by both parties,41 but most prominently
used by conservatives in Congress to excoriate agencies they dislike,42 the Act
provides a vehicle for cutting the budgets of agencies that do not perform, in
theory the public sector equivalent of the performance-based bonuses offered
private-sector managers.
This “cure” is often far worse than the disease. If the program is a desirable
one, budget cuts, even if they somehow discipline managers, will also make it
more difficult for an agency to deliver the benefits of the program to the public.
As frustrated as Congress may become with agency performance, no one would
suggest that the nation should stop carrying out such essential functions as
processing immigration applications or collecting taxes because Congress is
disgusted with the bureaucrats who administer such programs.
As a management tool, the GPRA has another significant disadvantage. If
Congress enacts significant budget cuts in response to a recommendation by the
President based on a performance review under the GPRA, it will be more
difficult for the agency to implement its statutory mission. If the budget cuts
have the impact of dismantling or hindering statutory programs, the budget cuts
will constitute a de facto repeal of the statutory mandate. Even though the
mandate may remain on the books, the agency will be unable to implement it in
any meaningful way. This repeal, however, will have occurred without

38. See Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics
Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 331 (1999) (noting that some political delegations are massively
incomplete because of the difficulty of specifying in advance what action an agent is to take).
39. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
40. See 139 CONG. REC. S7739, 7743 (June 23, 1993) (statement of Senator Glenn) (noting that
GPRA fits in a statutory constellation that includes the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Cash
Management Improvement Act of 1990, the Single Audit Act of 1984, the Federal Managers Financial
Integrity Act of 1982, the Prompt Payment Act of 1982, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and the
Inspector General Act of 1978).
41. For example, Alice Rivlin, director of the Office of Management and Budget under President
Clinton, has explained the GPRA as a way to “reduce the [budget] deficit in an intelligent way.” Alice
M. Rivlin, Linking Resources to Results: Management and Budgeting in a Time of Resource Constraints;
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, THE PUB. MANAGER: THE NEW BUREAUCRAT
(June 22, 1995) at 3–4.
42. See, e.g., Annys Shin, GOP Grades the Feds, But Not on a Curve, 17 NAT’L J. 939 (1998)
(reporting on GPRA “grades” awarded by prominent Republican conservatives to disfavored
agencies).
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Congress’s actually passing a bill that repeals the mandate, further undermining
the system of checks and balances and legitimate lawmaking. Since the budget
process is considerably more opaque than standard lawmaking, a significant cut
in an agency’s budget allows the President as well as Congress to avoid
accountability for rewriting popular laws.
3. Monitoring
A principal can seek to ensure the loyalty of an agent through contracting,
but the principal must also monitor the performance of the agent and determine
how well the agent is actually achieving the principal’s interests. The effort
required to monitor the agent’s exercise of its contractual duties will increase in
direct proportion to the incompleteness of the underlying contract because the
principal will not be able to simply check whether the agent has complied with a
detailed contractual term. Instead, the principal must identify the agent’s
actions and weigh the extent to which they are consistent with the principal’s
broader and often ill-defined objectives.
Such monitoring is made more difficult by information asymmetries.43 The
agent is often in control of information the principal needs to judge that
person’s performance. As a result, the agency cost problem is “most severe
when the interests or values of the principal and agent [have] diverge[d]
substantially, and information monitoring is costly.”44
Both private and public principals are subject to the problem of information
asymmetries. The regulation of financial markets, for example, includes
requirements that mandate the disclosure of certain types of financial
information and regulate the conduct of persons who produce that information.
These requirements assist individuals in deciding which agents to hire (that is
which firms to invest in) and in monitoring the performance of those agents.
The monitoring that occurs in the public sphere is somewhat more complicated.
Under the United States’ constitutional framework, both judges and members
of Congress perform monitoring functions.
a. Judges. Administrative law offers one crucial method of monitoring
the behavior of administrative agents in light of information asymmetries. As
one author notes, the “raison d’être [of administrative law] is to manage the
inevitable agency autonomy that comes with the legislative delegation and thus
to reduce ‘agency costs.’”45 The APA authorizes persons “adversely affected”
by final agency action to challenge that action in federal court.46 The APA also
authorizes federal judges to set aside agency actions that are inconsistent with a
statutory mandate47 or that are arbitrary and capricious.48 The Supreme Court
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 14, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Lindseth, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
Id. § 706(2)(C).
Id. § 706(2)(A).
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has interpreted this last provision to require an agency to offer a reasoned
explanation for its actions.49 The courts also expect an agency to make any
scientific tests or other technical data on which it relied in formulating a
proposed regulation available to the public.50
The threat of an adverse judicial decision creates a strong incentive for
administrators to disclose the information on which they relied and to defend
their decisions as nonarbitrary public policies consistent with the agency’s
statutory mandate. This system is also imperfect. For one thing, a court’s
capacity to require an agent to implement congressional intentions depends on
how clearly and precisely Congress has stated its intentions concerning how the
agent is to perform.51 But Congress has difficulty writing such specific
instructions.52 Even when congressional instructions to an agency are relatively
precise, judges may still choose to interpret a statute in a manner not intended
by the enacting Congress in order to fulfill their own policy and political goals.
Congress always has the alternative of overruling judicial interpretations by
amending the statute, but the hurdles to enacting corrective legislation are
many.
Moreover, not all agency actions are subject to judicial review. The judicial
review provisions of the APA do not apply when Congress has passed
legislation expressly precluding such review53 or when Congress does not
establish legal standards under which review can take place.54 Further, the
beneficiaries of regulation can seek review only if they have standing, which
requires that a plaintiff have a sufficiently direct interest in the lawsuit’s
outcome and that the lawsuit presents a “case and controversy.”55 In some
instances, the Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement to forestall
judicial review in cases in which the plaintiff sought to hold administrators
accountable for questionable policies.56

49. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40–43
(1983).
50. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
51. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1068–71 (1995).
52. See note 38 & accompanying text.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); see, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347–48, 352–53
(1984) (holding Congress had intended to preclude consumers from obtaining judicial review of milk
marketing orders by the Department of Agriculture).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 701(1)(2); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (The
APA prohibits judicial review when there is “no law to apply.”).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
56. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that individuals
could not sue government administrators to claim lack of compliance with the Endangered Species
Act). See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) (criticizing the Court’s standing
cases on the ground that an agency will be able to ignore legislative commands because no one who
opposes agency decisions will have standing to challenge them).
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Finally, but hardly least of all, not all actions subject to judicial review will
be challenged in a lawsuit. This problem is especially acute when a decision
affects a very large number of people adversely, producing a large collective
injury, but no person suffers an individual injury large enough to have a
sufficient incentive to sue. For the same reason, individuals will not have a
sufficient incentive to form a group to bring the lawsuit. The cost of organizing
the group will exceed the individual benefit to any one individual.57
b. Congress. Congress monitors agency performance through two types
of oversight. In “police patrol” oversight, Congress routinely oversees agency
action, investigating whether the executive branch is faithfully implementing
legislation.58 When Congress engages in audits, investigations, and other forms
of oversight, the goal is to make “it very difficult for agencies to strategically
manipulate congressional decisions by presenting a fait accompli, that is, a new
policy with already mobilized supporters.”59 Congress also engages in “fire
alarm” oversight to spot what it misses in “police patrol” oversight,60 depending
on third parties to spot significant deviations from statutory contracts by the
Branch, and then reacts to “fire alarms” pulled by disaffected interest groups.61
Significant agency costs remain despite legislative oversight. Members of
Congress often have strong incentives to shirk this role. Oversight is less
rewarding in terms of increasing the chances for members’ re-election than
other activities, such as constituent casework. Partisan concerns also play a
role. For example, Republicans holding a majority of seats in both houses of
Congress may slack off in order to protect a Republican President from the
embarrassing disclosures in committee hearings. Finally, the efficacy of “fire
alarm” oversight depends on how readily third parties can overcome
information asymmetries and find out about administrative failures. The trend
toward more secrecy makes it more difficult for third parties, that is citizens, to
engage in this function.
D. Transparency
The importance of government transparency should now be apparent.
Judicial review and legislative oversight are important methods of monitoring
executive branch performance, but they leave much to be desired. In light of
these imperfections, the public has a significant incentive to monitor the
performance of the executive branch.
Information asymmetries erect
substantial barriers to such monitoring. By removing information asymmetries,
laws that mandate disclosure make it feasible for the public to hold the
57. See OLSEN, supra note 11, at 48 (discussing the lack of financial incentives to engage in
collective political action).
58. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
59. KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 12, at 33 (emphasis added).
60. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 58, at 166.
61. Id.
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executive branch accountable. The cost of implementing transparency laws,
while expensive, is likely to be far less expensive than the agency costs that
occur if the executive branch fails to perform its statutory duties effectively.
Although transparency lies at the heart of reducing agency costs in the
public sector, making government more transparent will not necessarily lead to
significant or immediate reductions in agency costs. Even if the public is aware
of executive branch failures, collective action problems may prevent people
from acting on this information. Nevertheless, transparency is a prerequisite for
any effort to hold the executive branch more accountable. As Congress
implicitly concluded when it passed the open government statutes, excessive
government secrecy invariably translates into increased agency costs.62 These
laws, however, have been undermined by more recent legislation that—apart
from any effect on agency cost—in fact supports such greater secrecy.
III
A TALE OF THREE STATUTES
Laws mandating executive branch transparency typically require disclosure
but contain exemptions that balance the benefits of transparency against the
unacceptable costs of revealing secrets that could harm the public interest.
Three important statutes—the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),63 the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),64 and the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act (CIIA)65—typify such laws. The first two statutes have
transparent government as their primary goal, while the third embodies the
most pointed, recent statutory backlash against open government.
An agency-cost analysis of these laws reveals that the trend toward greater
government secrecy involves a shift away from the original FOIA model of
disclosure, making it significantly more difficult for the public to monitor the
executive branch. This shift has accelerated dramatically in the wake of the
tragedies that began on September 11, 2001. All three branches of government
have contributed to this rejection of the FOIA model. The judiciary has
interpreted FOIA and FACA in ways that weaken the presumption-ofdisclosure model. Congress has not only acquiesced in these changes, but,
ostensibly in response to the “war on terrorism,” passed the CIIA. President
Bush supported passage of the CIIA, and his Administration has vigorously
sought to increase the level of government secrecy through administrative

62. What is unknowable is the extent to which more disclosure reduces agency costs since it
depends on the extent to which collective action problems are overcome by the public. Unless one
assumes that more disclosure of Executive Branch failures will lead to no response by the public,
however, greater secrecy will increase agency costs.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
64. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1–15 (2000).
65. 6 U.S.C. §§ 131–134 (Supp. II 2002) (passed as part of Homeland Security Act of 2002).

06__SHAPIRO_STEINZOR.DOC

114

10/4/2006 9:05 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:99

interpretation,66 including interpretations of FOIA and FACA that make it
easier for the executive branch to avoid outside scrutiny.
A. The Freedom of Information Act
1. FOIA Requirements
FOIA is by far the most important law mandating transparency in
government.67
The statute has been under sustained attack, and its
implementation weakened substantially since President Bush took office.
FOIA is a paradigmatic disclosure statute for four reasons.68 First, the
statute established a strong baseline for disclosure by allowing access to
information without requiring the requestor to demonstrate any need to know.
The information covered by FOIA includes documents (broadly defined)
generated by the government, or by private-sector actors, so long as they are in
the possession (or custody) of the government. Second, the Act imposes strict
deadlines for the government’s response to information requests. Third, it
imposes the burden of justifying a decision to withhold information on the
government and requires that all such decisions fit under one of nine
exemptions specified in the statute. Decisions to withhold must be made with
respect to the status of the information at the time the request is made; that is,
information that once was a trade secret may have lost this protection given its
public circulation in the period since it was submitted. Finally, the Act subjects
decisions to withhold information to judicial review and instructs the judiciary
not to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute but rather to make a
decision regarding the legitimacy of nondisclosure de novo.
a. Disclosure baseline. The assumption that all information must be
disclosed without demonstrating a need to know was revolutionary at the time
FOIA was enacted in 1966. Prior to its enactment, government agencies and
departments had unrestricted authority to withhold information they either had
developed or had submitted to them by a wide range of private sector actors.
FOIA mandates two types of disclosure that did not previously exist. It
imposes affirmative obligations on executive branch agencies and departments
to make specific records available in public reading rooms, including “final
opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made
in the adjudication of cases”69 and any other information that “the agency
determines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent

66. See SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 81.
67. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
68. For a general description of the Act and the opportunities it provides requestors of
information, see Allen Robert Alder, American Civil Liberties Union, Step-by-Step Guide to Using the
Freedom of Information Act, available at http://www.skepticfiles.org/aclu/foia.htm (last visited on
October 28, 2005).
69. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (2000).
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requests.”70 The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996
further mandate that each agency establish a website for information that FOIA
requires the agency to make available in a reading room.71
Beyond this specific information, federal departments and agencies must
release records they possess in response to requests from any “person.”72
Requestors must provide a “reasonable” description of the information sought
and the request must correspond to the agency’s published rules concerning the
“time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed.”73 Agencies may
charge fees for the resources used in searching for the information and for
duplicating the records.74
b. Time deadlines. The government custodian of requested records must
respond to valid requests within twenty days, either disclosing the record or
explaining why it is exempt.75 However, as a practical matter, these deadlines
are often ignored, and, even if the requestor brings a lawsuit to enforce such
obligations, the courts grant liberal extensions in response to so-called Open
America motions.76 Nevertheless, the time deadlines are judicially enforceable,
which means agencies cannot ignore FOIA requests with impunity.
c. Government must justify secrecy. FOIA addresses the tradeoffs
between transparency and secrecy by creating nine exceptions to disclosure.77
By far the most important exemptions for the purposes of this discussion are the
first (exempting disclosure that “reasonably could be expected to cause damage
to national security”), the third (exemption for information “specifically
exempted from disclosure by another statute”), the fourth (exempting
disclosure of “trade secrets and other sensitive commercial data”), and the fifth

70. Id. § 552(a)(2)(D).
71. See Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 4(7), 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(2)(E) (2000)).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
73. See id. § 552(a)(3).
74. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A).
75. Id. § 552(a)(6)(a).
76. See Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the “Mother of All Complaints:” Information Delivery
and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN L. REV. 345, 348–58 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 77–84 (1997);
Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom of Information Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap Between Legislative
Intent and Economic Reality, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 325, 347–50 (1994).
77. FOIA exempts information from disclosure if (1) a specific Executive Order authorizes keeping
the information secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and the information is in fact
properly classified pursuant to the Executive Order, (2) the information is related solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of a government agency, (3) the information is specifically exempted from
disclosure by another statute, (4) the information constitutes trade secrets and other sensitive
commercial data, (5) the information is comprised of inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda that
are covered by the attorney/client privilege or compiled in preparation for a trial, (6) the information is
contained in individual personnel and medical files, (7) the request involves law enforcement
investigative files if disclosure would jeopardize the case or an informant, (8) the information concerns
the regulation of certain financial institutions, or (9) the information is geological and geophysical data
revealing oil well locations. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9).
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(exempting “inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda . . . covered by the
attorney/client privilege”). These are also the provisions most heavily litigated
in the four decades since the statute became law.
When Congress created the exemptions, it retained agency discretion to
disclose information even if it fits within one of the FOIA exemptions.78 The
agency does not have this discretion, however, if another statute forbids
disclosure of the information subject to a FOIA request. Anyone potentially
injured by such disclosure can sue to prevent disclosure in such circumstances,79
a process known as a reverse FOIA action.80
d. Judicial review. Finally, a person requesting information can seek
judicial review if the request is denied. Two aspects of judicial review are
important to government transparency. FOIA not only imposes the burden on
agencies or departments to justify applicability of the exemption,81 but a court
uses a de novo scope of review to judge the validity of agency’s arguments,
which means the judge is not obligated to give any deference to the agency’s
judgment in asserting an exemption claim.82 This scope of review is unusual. In
contrast, the APA generally requires judges to give deference to agency
decisions, and factual determinations are reviewed under an “arbitrary and
capricious” scope of review.83
2. FOIA Retrenchment
Although FOIA remains a key element in government transparency, its role
in reducing agency costs has been significantly weakened in the last several
years. For a time, the courts construed FOIA in a manner that increased the
amount of information available to the public, and in the few cases in which the
courts narrowed FOIA, Congress passed amendments to overrule these
decisions.84 More recently, the trend has been reversed. The courts have
generally acted to protect government information, and Congress has gone
along.

78. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293–94 (1979).
79. Id. at 318.
80. See Stephen F. Hehl, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler: A New Direction, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 185, 187 (1979); Paul M. Nick, De Novo Review in Reverse Freedom of Information Act Suits, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1308 (1989).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
82. See id.
83. Id. § 706(2)(A).
84. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
& PROCESS 435 (4th ed. 2004). As originally enacted, for example, FOIA exempted two types of
information from disclosure: information related to a government function “requiring secrecy in the
public interest” and information “relating solely to the internal management of an agency.” Pub. L.
No. 89-554, §552(a), 80 Stat. 378, 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. II
2002)). In 1976, Congress intensified the requirements for information exempted by statute. See Pub.
L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, 1242 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. II
2002)).
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The courts’ interpretation of the exemption for “trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential” is a particularly troubling example of recent trends.85 The courts
have interpreted this exemption in the broadest possible manner, ignoring other
interpretations that balance the economic reasons for protecting business
information against the goal of promoting government transparency.86
Unfortunately, Congress has chosen not to overrule these cases.
The Bush Administration has also acted to reduce the effectiveness of
FOIA.87 In October 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum
warning agencies that any decision to release information under FOIA that
might be kept confidential by claiming an exemption from disclosure “should be
made only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional,
commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by
disclosure of the information.”88
The memorandum pledged that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) would defend decisions not to release information
“unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse
impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records.”89
The memorandum reversed a Clinton Administration policy that agencies
should adopt a “presumption of disclosure”90 and that the DOJ would defend
decisions to withhold information “only in those cases where the agency
reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by
that exemption.”91
The change in policy appears to have substantially narrowed the amount of
information available under FOIA.
According to a Government
Accountability Office study that surveyed 183 FOIA officials at twenty-three
federal agencies, nearly one-third (thirty-one percent) reported that they were
less likely to release information because of the memorandum, and another
one-fourth reported that the Ashcroft memorandum had caused their agencies
to change their use of specific exemptions.92

85. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
86. Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce
and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1825 (1989). See also Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A.
Shapiro, The Trade Secrecy Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency
Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 857–82 (1980).
87. See Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the
Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
261, 263, 272–74 (2003).
88. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal Departments
and Agencies, The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/
04foia/011012.htm.
89. Id.
90. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Heads of Departments and Agencies,
The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993), http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html.
91. Id.
92. United States General Accounting Office, Freedom of Information Act, Agency Views on
Changes Resulting from New Administration Policy, GAO-03-981 11, 14 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03981.pdf; see also 4 OMB Watcher #19, GAO Report Indicates Less
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The Ashcroft memorandum flouts legislative intent and previous
administrative practice because it pressures federal custodians to withhold
disclosure under the widest possible interpretation of the statute, promoting a
“need to know” policy93 that stands in sharp contrast to the statute’s plain
language granting an absolute right to disclosure. As noted earlier, contrary to
the memorandum, decisions not to apply the nine exemptions lie within the
discretion of agencies and departments.94
Although the country has experienced a significant drift away from the
original conception of FOIA by the Congress that first enacted it in 1966, FOIA
continues to provide the best transparency tools available to people and a free
press seeking to monitor the fidelity of the executive branch to its statutory
mandates. By comparison, the courts have dealt a far more serious blow to the
efficacy of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).95
B. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
FACA was enacted in 1972 “to promote good-government values such as
openness, accountability, and balance of viewpoints.”96 It mandates that a
committee comprised of one or more private sector stakeholders convened to
advise a government agency or department must comply with a series of open
government requirements. On its face, FACA is a potentially powerful tool to
reduce agency costs, but the statute has been eviscerated by judicial
interpretations sought by hostile administrators.
1. FACA Requirements
FACA applies to any advisory group that is “established” or “utilized” by a
federal agency and that has at least one member who is not a federal
employee.97 It requires advisory committees to provide advance notice of their
public meetings, with some narrow exceptions.98 Committees must keep
minutes of their meetings, and those minutes, as well as all other committee
records, must remain open to the public unless the information falls within one

Information Available Under Ashcroft (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.ombwatch.org/article/
articleview/1821/1/189/.
93. See Laura Parker, et al., Secure Often Means Secret, USA TODAY, May 16, 2002, at 1A
(quoting Gary Bass, executive director of OMB Watch, as stating, “We seem to be shifting to the
public’s need to know instead of the public’s right to know.”), quoted in Uhl, supra note 87, at 285.
94. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
95. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 1–15 (2000).
96. Steven P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 111, 117 (1996); see also Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 73 (1994) (noting congressional hearings on
FACA “focused on the non-representative nature of the advisory committees, and the need to open
their proceedings and reports to the public”).
97. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2).
98. See id. § 10 (meetings may be closed to protect national security, to avoid the release of
information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, or to protect trades secrets and
confidential commercial and financial information).
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of the FOIA exemptions and the government chooses to withhold it.99 The law
requires annual reporting on the status and budgets of the committees
established under these provisions.100
FACA has the potential to reduce agency costs for two reasons. First, it
requires that any group of special interest representatives convened by the
government in order to influence public policy must meet in the open, where
the group’s deliberations can be monitored to ensure that they do not interfere
with the executive branch’s fidelity to its statutory mandates.101 Equally
significant, FACA requires that such panels be “fairly balanced” with different
points of view, serving as a further hedge against disproportionate suasion from
a specific economic sector.102
2. FACA Retrenchment
In light of the value of these requirements in reducing agency costs, it is
perhaps not surprising that this ostensibly benign piece of “good government”
law has come under sustained attack. The executive branch has persuaded the
courts to create significant loopholes in FACA’s coverage.
a. The Public Citizen case. In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Public
Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,103 holding that a committee of the
American Bar Association (ABA), which evaluated the legal abilities of
persons nominated to be federal judges, was not an advisory committee under
FACA.104 The implications of applying FACA broadly provoked the Court’s
doubts that Congress had intended for FACA to apply “any time the President
seeks the views of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) before nominating Commissioners to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, or asks the leaders of an American Legion Post he is
visiting for the organization’s opinion on some aspect of military policy.”105 The
Court simply did not believe that Congress intended to intrude on the
operations of private groups, such as the ABA, to this extent.106 Finally, the
Court observed that construing FACA to apply to the Justice Department’s
consultations with the ABA presented “formidable” constitutional difficulties:107
The District Court declared FACA unconstitutional insofar as it applied to those
consultations, because it concluded that FACA, so applied, infringed unduly on the
President’s Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id.
Id. § 6(c).
See id. § 10(a)–(b).
See id. § 5(b)(2).
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 452–53.
See id. at 453.
Id. at 466.
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separation of powers. Whether or not the court’s conclusion was correct, there is no
108
gainsaying the seriousness of these constitutional challenges.

To reach this result, however, the Court had to overcome the Act’s broad
language, including its definition of “advisory committee” as any committee
“established or utilized” by an agency “in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations.”109 According to Public Citizen, an agency “establishes” an
advisory committee only if it actually forms the panel itself,110 and it “utilizes” an
advisory committee only if the panel is so closely tied to an agency as to be
“amenable to [] strict management by agency officials . . . .”111
b. Expansion of Public Citizen. Whether or not the Court intended this
result, Public Citizen created a sizeable loophole because it enabled agencies to
avoid FACA requirements altogether by simply asking a nongovernmental
outside group to form an advisory committee. Two cases illustrate this
unfortunate outcome.
In Food Chemical News v. Young,112 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an advisory group formed by a governmental contractor was not
“established” or “utilized” by an agency for advice.113 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) had hired the Federation of America Societies for
Experimental Biology (FASEB), a federation of major bio-medical research
organizations, to organize an advisory panel of scientific experts to advise it on
issues relating to the safety of foods and cosmetics.114 Although FDA had hired
the FASEB to establish a peer review panel, the court held that the panel had
not been “established” by FDA, but by the FASEB. Further, although the
advice of the panel had been used by FDA, the agency nevertheless had not
“utilize[d]” the panel because the agency had not exerted significant influence
over the committee’s formation.115
The D.C. Circuit reached a similar result nearly a decade later in Byrd v.
United States EPA,116 holding that a peer review panel convened by an EPA
contractor, the Eastern Research Group (ERG), was not a FACA advisory
committee.117 This time around, however, EPA had had far more involvement
in the formation and deliberation of the committee than FDA had concerning
the FASEB panel. EPA had hired ERG to provide a peer review of a report on
the carcinogenic effects of benzene. Under the contract, the EPA determined
the issues for the panel to evaluate; proposed potential members of the panel

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 466–67 (citation omitted).
See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (2000).
See 491 U.S. at 452, 456–57, 461-63.
See id. at 457–58.
900 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990).
Id. at 333.
See id. at 329–30.
See id. at 333.
174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018 (2000).
See id. at 245–48.
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and expressed its approval of the persons chosen by ERG; held a
teleconference with ERG and the selected panelists, instructing them as to the
nature of their duties; and sent EPA employees to attend and participate in the
meeting.118 In the court’s view, none of these activities was sufficient to trigger
the application of FACA. The court interpreted prior cases as holding that
participation by an agency, or even an agency’s “significant influence” over a
committee’s deliberations, does not qualify as sufficient management and
control such that the committee is “utilized” by the agency under FACA.119
These cases rest on a mechanistic application of “establish” and “utilize” as
defined by the Supreme Court in Public Citizen without considering whether
that decision should be expanded to cover a different set of facts. In Public
Citizen, the Court was concerned that FACA not be extended to every occasion
when the federal government asked an outside organization for advice. The
Court offered two reasons why it was not Congress’s intention to apply FACA
to organizations like the ABA or the NAACP when they offered advice to the
President. Neither reason applies when an agency hires a private contractor to
form an advisory committee.
The first reason was that FACA requires a government official to be in
charge of each advisory committee, and the Court could not believe that
Congress intended to intrude on the operations of private groups, such as the
ABA, to this extent.120 The situation, however, is entirely different when an
agency hires a private contractor to form an advisory committee. Since there is
extensive regulation of private contractors by the federal government, it is
highly unlikely that Congress would have been concerned that FACA might
intrude on how a contractor operates an advisory committee.
The Court also justified its interpretation on the ground that the application
of FACA to the ABA would unduly infringe on the President’s Article II power
to nominate federal judges and thereby violate the doctrine of separation of
powers.121 There is no similar constitutional concern if FACA applies to private
contractors who are hired to form an advisory committee by a government
agency.
The reason for the hostility of the D.C. Circuit to FACA is not apparent
from its decisions in Food Chemical News and Byrd. What is clear is that these
judges gave no serious consideration to the public’s interest in executive branch
transparency and the important role that FACA can play in reducing agency
costs. That court could have, and should have, distinguished Public Citizen, and
held that FACA applies to private contractors.
c. The aftermath of Public Citizen. Taking full advantage of the
loophole created by the D.C. Circuit, the Bush Administration has structured a
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 241–42.
Id. at 246.
See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452–53.
See id. at 466–67.
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number of important advisory committees in a manner to avoid the Act,
including the President’s Commission on Intelligence on Weapons of Mass
Destruction, the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, and the
Energy Project Streamlining Task Force.122 It has also successfully supported
legislative exemptions for other advisory committees. For example, the
Homeland Security Act gives the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to
exempt any committee from FACA, whether or not the committee falls within
the already established exception that allows agencies and departments to close
meetings if necessary to protect national security.123
Compounding these trends, the Bush Administration has argued that the
Constitution bars the application of FACA to the White House. Shortly after
taking office in 2000, President Bush established the National Energy Policy
Development Group, chaired by Vice President Cheney, to recommend a
national energy plan. The task force, composed of federal officials, apparently
met with various energy producers and trade associations but made no effort to
meet with environmental or other public interest groups. Judicial Watch and
the Sierra Club sued the government, claiming that FACA applied to the task
force. The plaintiffs sought the right to obtain information that might support
their case from White House officials.124 The White House objected that such
discovery would violate separation of powers and would interfere with the
constitutional prerogatives of the President and Vice President.125 The D.C.
District Court permitted some discovery and said that the White House could
refuse to disclose specific documents on the grounds of executive privilege.
Once such a claim was made, the court indicated it would rule whether such
documents had to be disclosed.
The White House brought an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
order, arguing that the Constitution barred the use of discovery altogether. The
court threw out the interlocutory appeal, explaining: “The Government comes
to this court . . . to block discovery, having never claimed that any of the
disputed material is privileged and having never responded to the District
Court’s invitation to specify their objections to the disputed discovery orders.”126
The Supreme Court overruled that decision and ordered the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit to consider the White House’s argument.127
On remand, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the district court lacked legal
authority to compel the White House to produce any documents concerning the
participation of private parties in meetings of the Energy Task Force.128 Judicial
122. SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 38–42.
123. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 871, 116 Stat. 2135, 2243 (2002) (codifed
at 6 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. II 2002)).
124. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23-24 (D.D.C.
2002).
125. See id. at 44–45.
126. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
127. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2593 (2004).
128. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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Watch based its argument that FACA applied to the Task Force on an earlier
decision of the D.C. Circuit holding that FACA applied when private parties
regularly attend and fully participate in government-run committee meetings so
as to constitute “de-facto” members of the committee.129 This time around,
however, the D.C. Circuit narrowed its prior interpretation of FACA.
The Court did not reach the merits of the constitutional argument raised by
the White House, but it did rule that “separation-of-powers considerations have
an important bearing on the proper interpretation of the statute.”130 In light of
the separation-of-powers problems, the Court strictly interpreted the extent to
which FACA applies to the executive office of the President. It held that the
participation of private persons in advisory committees appointed by the
President did not come within the ambit of FACA unless a private person has
an official voting role on the committee or, if the committee acts by consensus, a
veto over the committee’s decisions.131 Since neither Judicial Watch nor the
Sierra Club had explicitly alleged that any private person played such a role, the
Court determined the district court lacked any legal basis to compel the White
House to respond to the plaintiff’s request for documents.132
The effort by the D.C. Circuit to exempt the Vice President and President
from FACA is another significant departure from the plain language and clear
intent of the statute. To be fair, however, the court was responding after a
Supreme Court opinion that strongly indicated its sympathy for the White
House’s constitutional claim.133 The Supreme Court had also criticized the
district court’s solution that the White House should assert executive privilege if
it wished to raise a constitutional objection to turning over specific documents.
The Court had objected to this approach because it would force the judiciary
“into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial
proceeding and the executive’s Article II prerogatives.”134
It is a time-honored tradition that the chief executive be given significant
autonomy to receive confidential advice from his cabinet and staff, but these
cases present an entirely different issue: namely, whether K-Street lobbyists
can lobby the executive with impunity without even acknowledging that such
conversations took place. As noted earlier, there are important tradeoffs
between transparency and secrecy that must be considered and resolved. The
Supreme Court, however, appears to have endorsed a broad constitutional
protection for the White House, precluding a more nuanced approach that
would recognize the tradeoffs and seek to balance them appropriately.

129. See id. at 726 (citing Assoc. of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898
(D.C. Cir. 1993)).
130. Id. at 727.
131. Id. at 728.
132. See id. at 730–31.
133. The Court of Appeals had dismissed the separation of powers concerns of the White House on
the basis of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See In re Cheney, 334 F.3d at 1098–99.
134. Id. at 2592.
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C. Critical Infrastructure Information Act
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Congress has sat on the sidelines
while the White House and the courts have narrowed the applications of FOIA
and FACA, demonstrating its own lack of fidelity to the original legislative
intent of this legislation. Congress has also contributed to the trend toward
secrecy by passing the Critical Infrastructure Information Act (CIIA) as part of
the Homeland Security Act.135 FOIA has an exemption for information
specifically exempted by another statute from disclosure.136 The CIIA is such a
statute. It prohibits the government from disclosing “critical infrastructure
information” that is “voluntarily submitted” to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS),137 protecting such material from disclosure under FOIA.
The Homeland Security Act accomplished the most significant
reorganization of the federal government in several decades. Dozens of new
provisions cover everything from the transfer of existing agencies to the new
DHS to the creation of several “directorates” to enhance domestic security.
Although a handful of opponents opposed Congress’s rush to judgment on such
complicated legislation,138 a large majority, confronted by intense pressure from
President Bush and the public’s anxiety about terrorism, persevered. The CIIA
was one consequence of this telescoped and highly politicized process. Despite
its importance, the bill was barely mentioned during the truncated
congressional debate.
One of the hallmarks of FOIA is that the nine exemptions allowing (but not
requiring) the government to withhold information from disclosure were
narrowly and carefully crafted by Congress. In contrast, the CIIA not only
prohibits the government from releasing protected information, but it forbids
the use of such information by the government or private parties in civil
litigation.
1. Overbreadth
The national concern about sequestering information that is useful to
terrorists is understandable. But if one has a fertile imagination, it is possible to
construct a scenario for terrorist use of a wide variety of information that is also
of great value to the public. The CIIA suffers from three major defects.
a. Definition of critical infrastructure information. The statute contains
language that could result in a preposterously broad scope:

135. See 6 U.S.C § 131 (Supp. II 2002).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
137. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1). For a thorough explanation of the statutory language see Rena I.
Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate
Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 645–50 (2003).
138. See, e.g., Gail R. Chaddock, Bush Spurs Lame-Duck Session to Action, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 18, 2002, at 2 (“For heavens sake, we have a right to know what is in this 484-page bill,
and as of this moment, we do not,” Senator Byrd said on the floor of the Senate.).
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The term “critical infrastructure information” means information not customarily in
the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected
systems—(A)
actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on,
compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by
either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the
misuse of or unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission
systems) that violates Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the
139
United States, or threatens public health or safety.

The CIIA notes that “critical infrastructure information” is “related to the
security of critical infrastructures or protected systems,” but the Act omits a
definition of “critical infrastructure.” Instead, it refers to the definition of “vital
infrastructure” set forth in the Patriot Act,140 which includes “systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual,” the destruction of which would have a
“debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety.”141
This definition does not condition inclusion of a facility on the likelihood
that information about it is likely to be used in a terrorist attack, but rather
extends the definition to any facility that, if destroyed, could have a debilitating
impact on economic security. It is hard to imagine a manufacturing facility of
any significance that would not meet the definition in the Patriot Act.
If interpreted expansively by secrecy-minded courts, the CIIA has the
potential to shield from disclosure a broad range of private-sector
communications that are of no assistance to potential terrorists. For example,
the Act appears to authorize a corporate lobbyist “[to] meet secretly with DHS
officials to urge changes to federal immigration or customs regulations if the
lobbyist asserts that the changes are related to the effort to protect the nation’s
infrastructure.”142 As the Heritage Foundation’s Mark Tapscott has noted,
“One need not be a Harvard law graduate to see that, without clarification of
what constitutes vulnerabilities [of infrastructure], this loophole could be
manipulated by clever corporate and government operators to hide endless
varieties of potentially embarrassing and/or criminal information from public
view.”143
b. Permanent secrecy. The DHS regulations implementing the CIIA
exacerbate its overbreadth. As noted, the CIIA sets out certain bare-bones
conditions for information to qualify for nondisclosure.144 In theory at least, the
DHS is under some affirmative obligation to check submissions stamped “CII”
by the private sector to ensure that they meet these conditions. Yet in rules
implementing the Act, the DHS says it will look at the information only once,

139. 6 U.S.C. § 131.
140. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (Supp. I 2001).
142. SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 9.
143. Tapscott, supra note 6.
144. See 6 U.S.C. § 131(3).
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when it first comes in.145 Thereafter, no matter what changes occur in the status
of the information or its import, it will remain forever secret. So, for example, a
facility could be torn down, eliminating it as a target for terrorists, but any
information about problems that occurred there would be withheld from
disclosure and, not incidentally, from use in court, as explained below.146
c. No redaction. Unlike FOIA, the CIIA does not require the release of
as much information as can be released, with the redaction of any withheld
information.147 Depending on how the courts interpret this omission, the Act
could authorize the government to keep all of the information in a document
secret, even those portions that do not themselves meet the definition of critical
infrastructure information.
d. Harsh penalties. Finally, the CIIA contains harsh penalties for
disclosure of critical infrastructure information in an effort to motivate federal
government employees to err on the side of nondisclosure if they have any
doubts about whether information must be kept secret.148 Government officials
who knowingly disclose voluntarily submitted critical infrastructure information
face criminal liability, with a maximum sentence of one year in prison.149
2. Civil Immunity
The CIIA goes further than simply making a universe of information secret.
The CIIA prohibits the use of “critical infrastructure information” voluntarily
submitted to the DHS from being “used directly by such agency, any other
Federal, State, or local authority, or any third party, in any civil action arising
under Federal or State law if such information is submitted in good faith.”150
This unprecedented protection means that not only is the public unlikely to
find out about transgressions of the executive branch, but that critical
infrastructure information held by DHS cannot be used to hold regulated
entities accountable for the violation of federal laws or for imposing tort
liability. Depending on how the courts interpret this language, the Act could be
interpreted to prohibit the use of information held by DHS as critical
infrastructure information regardless of whether the government or a private

145. See Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 6 C.F.R. § 29.6(e) (2005). The rule was
proposed on April 15, 2003. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18524 (Apr. 15, 2003). It became effective as an interim rule on February 20, 2004, and apparently
continues to operate as an interim rule. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure
Information; Interim Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074 (Feb. 20, 2004). The rule presumes that all information
submitted satisfies the requirements for protection unless and until the department finds otherwise. 6
C.F.R. § 29.6(b).
146. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
147. SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 9–10.
148. Id. at 10.
149. 6 U.S.C. § 133(f).
150. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(C).
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party has (or can) obtain the information from some other source, such as by
subpoenaing it from the company under investigation or being sued.
This worrisome aspect of the CIIA could hamper government enforcement
efforts, as well as preclude injured parties from recovering damages in tort
actions. Since both types of actions deter government malfeasance, an
expansive reading of the CIIA would significantly increase agency costs. An
overly broad interpretation of the immunity provisions could create an
incentive for companies to submit information to DHS in order to forestall its
use by government or plaintiffs lawyers in litigation against the company.
3. The Consequences
The extent to which the CIIA will increase agency costs is unknown.
Companies appear to be reluctant to submit information to DHS under the
Act.151 It is no small irony that the most hopeful prospect for decreasing agency
costs is corporate America’s traditional suspicion that submitting information to
the government voluntarily can only cause trouble for a company. But this
resistance could be overcome if courts interpret the Act broadly and companies
become convinced that they have something to gain from such protections.
For its part, DHS has shown little interest in narrowing the CIIA. Indeed,
the opposite appears to be the case. Consider, for example, its recent proposal
concerning the implementation plans of its various “components” (the agencies
consolidated to form the Department) regarding the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) mandate contained in the National Environmental Policy Act
The proposal announces that any “critical infrastructure
(NEPA).152
information” contained in an EIS, regardless of whether it was voluntarily
submitted or even generated by the government and regardless of whether it is
already in the public domain, will be withheld from disclosure.153 Since the
purpose of the law is to inform public consideration of the merits of

151. Professor Steinzor represented OMB Watch, a nonprofit public interest organization that
serves as a watchdog for regulatory agencies, in a FOIA lawsuit seeking information about the number
of CIIA requests that the DHS had received as of March 2005. Documents released prior to settlement
of the lawsuit indicated that the total number of such requests was twenty-seven.
152. NEPA requires that all federal agencies “include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement” about the action’s environmental impacts. 42 U.S.C. §
4332(C) (2000).
153. See Timely and Effective Environmental Planning in the Department of Homeland Security, 69
Fed. Reg. 33043, 33063 (June 14, 2004). The Natural Resources Defense Council submitted comments
objecting to the proposed regulation on the grounds that it would limit public access to information,
much of which is currently available to the public, about activities that could harm the environment.
See Comments from Sharon Buccino, Senior Attorney, & Max Wilson, Legal Intern, Natural Resources
Defense Council, to Environmental Planning, Department of Homeland Security, 1 (July 14, 2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Mgmt_NEPA_NRDC_071404.pdf. The Center for
Progressive Regulation also submitted comments urging DHS to rethink the proposed regulation
because its sweeping secrecy provisions violate NEPA. See Comments from Rena Steinzor, Board
Member and Member Scholar & Karen Sokol, Staff Counsel, Center For Progressive Regulation, to
Environmental Planning, Department of Homeland Security, 1 (Aug. 16, 2004), available at
www.progressivereform.org.
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construction (and other) projects, this effort to pluck a definition from the
Homeland Security Act and drop it into a statutory scheme famous for its
transparency will almost certainly be challenged in court if DHS does not
review the statutory language more carefully and radically change its proposal.
While it is clearly premature to predict catastrophe, there can be no
question that the CIIA has the potential to overwhelm FOIA when companies
invoke it broadly. An expansive reading would transform the CIIA into a
radical reversal of common tort liability and open government requirements.
Under this scenario, the CIIA would immunize corporations and their
employees from malfeasance in routine activities, from discrimination on the
basis of race in the workplace, to embezzlement, to violations of environmental
laws, to negligence that harms the general public financially or physically. Not
incidentally, these interpretations would also immunize corporations that
proved negligent in the face of terrorist threats, allowing them to avoid
accountability for endangering their fellow citizens.
IV
CONCLUSION
The executive branch serves as the public’s agent for purposes of
implementing and enforcing regulatory mandates. There are agency costs in
this arrangement because administrators will not always produce the public
health, safety, and environmental benefits intended by Congress. Deterring
such behavior by executive branch agents is a critical component of our
constitutional system.
Although the agency-cost problem arises in the context of both private and
public sectors, it is a more difficult problem in the public sector. As a general
matter, it is more likely that agency contracts in the public sector will be
incomplete. In addition, principals will find it more difficult to change agents
and to use financial incentives to reduce agency costs.
Since the tools regularly used in the private sector to reduce agency costs
are not as effective in the public sector, the public relies on forms of monitoring
unique to the public sector:
judicial review and legislative oversight.
Information asymmetries frustrate these efforts. The primary purpose of the
nation’s open government laws is to eliminate such asymmetries so that the
public, through a free press and Congress, can hold the executive branch
accountable for breaching its fiduciary duties.
In 1977, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was Chief of Staff to
President Gerald Ford, and Vice President Richard Cheney was his deputy.
Presumably acting under their advice, President Ford vetoed amendments
expanding FOIA, only to have his veto overridden by Congress. Across three
decades, the concerns reflected in the Ford veto have once again risen to the
forefront of government information policy.
As this article has begun to demonstrate, shrouding the government in
secrecy conflicts with an essential attribute of the United States’ constitutional
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democracy. Unless there is reason to believe—for the first time in the nation’s
history—the executive branch can function effectively and ethically without
scrutiny for extended periods, undermining those checks and balances will
impose large costs.

